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Linking the microscopic and macroscopic behavior is at the heart of
many natural and social sciences. This apparent similarity conceals
essential differences across disciplines: while physical particles are
assumed to optimize the global energy, economic agents maximize
their own utility. Here, we solve exactly a Schelling-like segregation
model, which interpolates continuously between cooperative and in-
dividual dynamics. We show that increasing the degree of cooper-
ativity induces a qualitative transition from a segregated phase of
low utility towards a mixed phase of high utility. By introducing a
simple function which links the individual and global levels, we pave
the way to a rigorous approach of a wide class of systems, where
dynamics is governed by individual strategies.
socioeconomy | statistical physics | segregation | phase transition
Introduction
The intricate relations between the individual and collective
levels are at the heart of many natural and social sciences. Dif-
ferent disciplines wonder how atoms combine to form solids
[1, 2], neurons give rise to consciousness [3, 4] or individu-
als shape societies [5, 6]. However, scientific fields assume
distinct points of view for defining the “normal”, or “equilib-
rium” aggregated state. Physics looks at the collective level,
selecting the configurations that minimize the global free en-
ergy [2]. In contrast, economic agents behave in a selfish way,
and equilibrium is attained when no agent can increase its
own satisfaction [7]. Although similar at first sight, the two
approaches lead to radically different outcomes.
In this paper, we illustrate the differences between collective
and individual dynamics on an exactly solvable model, simi-
lar to Schelling’s segregation model [8]. The model considers
individual agents which prefer a mixed environment, with dy-
namics that lead to segregated or mixed patterns at the global
level. A “tax” parameter monitors continuously the agents’
degree of altruism or cooperativity, i.e., their consideration
of the global welfare. At high degrees of cooperativity, the
system is in a mixed phase of maximal utility. As the altru-
ism parameter is decreased, a phase transition occurs, lead-
ing to segregation. In this phase, the agents’ utilities remain
low, in spite of continuous efforts to maximize their satisfac-
tion. This paradoxical result of Schelling’s segregation model
[8] has generated an abundant literature. Many papers have
simulated how the global state depends on specific individual
utility functions, as reviewed by [9]. There have been attempts
at solving Schelling’s model analytically, in order to provide
more general results [10, 11, 12]. However, these approaches
are limited to specific utility functions. More recently, physi-
cists have tried to use a statistical physics approach to under-
stand the segregation transition [13, 14, 15]. The idea seems
promising, since statistical physics has successfully bridged
the micro-macro gap for physical systems governed by col-
lective dynamics. However, progress was slow by lack of an
appropriate framework allowing for individual dynamics [13].
In this paper, we introduce a rigorous generalization of the
physicist’s free energy, which includes individual dynamics.
By introducing a ”link” state function which is maximized in
the stationary state, we pave the way to analytical treatments
of a much wider class of systems, where dynamics is governed
by individual strategies. Applied to the above Schelling-like
segregation model, this approach offers a quantitative solution
for very general utility functions.
Model
Our model represents in a schematic way the dynamics of res-
idential moves in a city. For simplicity, we include one type
of agents, but our results can readily be generalized to deal
with agents of two “colors”, as in the original Schelling model
[8] (see below and Supporting Information). The city is di-
vided into Q blocks (Q≫ 1), each block containing H cells or
flats (Fig 1). We assume that each cell can contain at most
one agent, so that the number nq of agents in a given block
q (q = 1, . . . , Q) satisfies nq ≤ H, and we introduce the den-
sity of agents ρq = nq/H. Each agent has the same utility
function u(ρq), which describes the degree of satisfaction con-
cerning the density of the block he is living in. The collective
utility is defined as the total utility of all the agents in the
city: U(x) = H
P
q ρqu(ρq), where x ≡ {ρq} corresponds to
the coarse-grained configuration of the city, i.e. the knowledge
of the density of each block. For a given x, there is a large
number of ways to arrange the agents in the different cells.
This number of arrangements is quantified by its logarithm
S(x), called the entropy of the configuration x.
The dynamical rule allowing the agents to move from one
block to another is the following. At each time step, one picks
up at random an agent and a vacant cell, within two differ-
ent blocks. Then the agent moves in that empty cell with
probability:
Pxy =
1
1 + e−G/T
, [1]
where x and y are respectively the configurations before and
after the move, and G is the gain associated to the proposed
move. The positive parameter T is a “temperature” which
introduces in a standard way [16] some noise on the decision
process. It can be interpreted as the effect of features that are
not explicitly included in the utility function but still affect
the moving decision (urban facilities, friends. . . ). We write
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the gain G as :
G = ∆u+ α(∆U −∆u) [2]
where ∆u is the variation of the agent’s own utility upon mov-
ing and ∆U is the variation of the total utility of all agents.
The parameter 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 weights the contribution of the
other agents’ utility variation in the calculation of the gain
G, and it can thus be interpreted as a degree of cooperativ-
ity (or altruism). For α = 0, the probability to move only
depends on the selfish interest of the chosen agent, which cor-
responds to the spirit of economic models such as Schelling’s.
When α = 1, the decision to move only depends on the col-
lective utility change, as in physics’ models. An economical
interpretation could be that individual moves are controlled
by a central government, via a tax that internalizes all the
externalities (more on this below). Varying α in a continuous
way, one can interpolate between the two limiting behaviors
of individual and collective dynamics.
Results
We wish to find the stationary probability distribution Π(x) of
the microscopic configurations x. If the gain G can be written
as G = ∆V ≡ V (y) − V (x), where V (x) is a function of the
configuration x, then the dynamics satisfies detailed balance
[17] and the distribution Π(x) is given by
Π(x) =
1
Z
eF (x)/T , [3]
with F (x) = V (x) + TS(x) and Z a normalization con-
stant. The entropy has for large H the standard expression
S(x) = H
P
q s(ρq), with
s(ρ) = −ρ ln ρ− (1− ρ) ln(1− ρ). [4]
We now need to find the function V (x), if it exists. Given
the form (2) of G, finding such a function V (x) amounts to
finding a “link” function L(x), connecting the individual and
collective levels, such that ∆u = ∆L. The function V would
thus be given by V (x) = (1 − α)L(x) + αU(x). By analogy
to the entropy, we assume that L(x) can be written as a sum
over the blocks, namely L(x) = H
P
q ℓ(ρq). Considering a
move from a block at density ρ1 to a block at density ρ2, ∆L
reduces in the large H limit to ℓ′(ρ2)− ℓ
′(ρ1), where ℓ
′ is the
derivative of ℓ. The condition ∆u = ∆L then leads to the
identification ℓ′(ρ) = u(ρ), from which the expression of ℓ(ρ)
follows:
ℓ(ρ) =
Z ρ
0
u(ρ′)dρ′. [5]
As a result, the function F (x) can be expressed in the large
H limit as F (x) = H
P
q f(ρq), with a block potential f(ρ)
given by :
f(ρ) = −Tρ ln ρ− T (1− ρ) ln(1− ρ)
+ αρu(ρ) + (1− α)
Z ρ
0
u(ρ′)dρ′. [6]
The probability Π(x) is dominated by the configurations
x = {ρq} that maximize the sum
P
q f(ρq) under the con-
straint of a fixed ρ0 = Q
−1 PQ
q=1 ρq. To perform this maxi-
mization procedure, we follow standard physics methods used
in the study of phase transitions (like liquid-vapor coexistence
[18]), which can be summarized as follows. If f(ρ) coincides
with its concave hull at a given density ρ0, then the state
of the city is homogeneous, and all blocks have a density ρ0.
Otherwise, a phase separation occurs: some blocks have a
density ρ∗1 < ρ0, while the others have a density ρ
∗
2 > ρ0 (see
Supporting Information).
Interestingly, the potential F = (1 − α)L + αU + TS ap-
pears as a generalization of the notion of free energy intro-
duced in physical systems. Mapping the global utility U onto
the opposite of the energy of a physical system, it turns out
that for α = 1, the maximization of the function U + TS is
equivalent to the minimization of the free energy E−TS. For
α < 1, the potential F takes into account individual moves
through the link function L. Furthermore, the potential F can
be calculated for arbitrary utility functions, allowing to pre-
dict analytically the global town state. Such an achievement
eluded so far individualistic, Schelling-type models, which had
to be studied through numerical simulations [9].
To obtain explicitly the equilibrium configurations, one
needs to know the specific form of the utility function. To
illustrate the dramatic influence of the cooperativity parame-
ter α, we use the asymmetrically peaked utility function [19],
which indicates that agents prefer mixed blocks (Figure 2).
The overall town density is fixed at ρ0 = 1/2 to avoid the
trivial utility frustration resulting from the impossibility to
attain the optimal equilibrium (ρq = 1/2 for all blocks). We
also consider for simplicity the limit T → 0, to avoid entropy
effects. The qualitative behaviour of the system is unchanged
for ρ0 6= 1/2 or for low values of the temperature, as shown
in the Supplementary Information.
In the collective case (α = 1), the optimal state corre-
sponds to the configuration that maximizes the global util-
ity, which can be immediately guessed from Figure 2, namely
ρq = 1/2 for all q (Fig 1a). On the contrary, in the selfish case
(α = 0, Fig 1b), maximization of the potential F (x) shows
that the town settles in a segregated configuration where a
fraction of the blocks are empty and the others have a density
ρs > 1/2. Surprisingly, the city settles in this state of low
utility in spite of agents’ continuous efforts to maximize their
own satisfaction. To understand this frustrated configuration,
note that the collective equilibrium (ρq = 1/2 for all q) is now
an unstable Nash equilibrium at T > 0. The instability can be
understood by noting that at T > 0 there is a positive proba-
bility that an agent accepts a slight decrease of its utility, and
leaves a block with density ρq = 1/2. The agents remaining in
its former block now have a lower utility and are more likely
to leave to another ρq = 1/2 block. This creates an avalanche
which empties the block, as each move away further decreases
the utility of the remaining agents. This avalanche stops when
the stable (Nash) equilibrium, given by the maximum of the
potential, is reached. This state corresponds to a spatially in-
homogeneous repartition of agents in the city. To understand
the transition between mixed and segregated configurations, it
is instructive to calculate the values of both the overall utility
and the potential, for different values of m (at α = 0). For ho-
mogeneous towns, for allm, the normalized collective utility is
given by U∗ = U/(ρ0HQ) = u(ρ0 = 1/2) = 1 and the normal-
ized link function equals L∗ = L/(ρ0HQ) = ℓ(ρ0)/ρ0 = 1/2,
where ℓ is given in Eq. 5. The values of L∗ and U∗ displayed
in Table 1 show that the utility of the segregated equilibrium
is lower but that its potential is higher, explaining its stabil-
ity. Note that the gap between the link function values of the
homogeneous and segregated configurations increases with m.
This helps understanding why the greater the m, the
greater the value of tax parameter necessary to reach the ho-
mogeneous configuration. Indeed, the segregated states are
separated from mixed ones by a phase transition at the crit-
ical value αc = 1/(3 − 2m) - which increases with m (Figure
3). This transition differs from standard equilibrium phase
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transitions known in physics, which are most often driven by
the competition between energy and entropy. Here, the tran-
sition is driven by a competition between the collective and
individual components of the agents’ dynamics. The unsatis-
factory global state of the city can be interpreted, from the
economics’ point of view, as an effect of externalities: by mov-
ing to increase its utility, an agent may decrease other agents’
utilities, without taking this into account. From a standard
interpretation in terms of Pigouvian tax [20], one expects that
α = 1 is necessary to reach the optimal state, since by def-
inition this value internalizes all the externalities the agent
causes to the others when moving. Our results show that the
optimal state is maintained until much lower tax values (for
example, αc = 1/3 at m = 0), a surprising result which de-
serves further analysis. Another interesting effect is observed
for m > 2/3 (Figure 3). Introducing a small tax has no effect
on the overall satisfaction, the utility remaining constant until
a threshold level is attained at αt = (3m− 2)/(6− 5m).
We focused up to now on the zero temperature limit. For
low temperatures, the main qualitative conclusions are not
modified, as the phase diagram is modified only for extremal
values of ρ0 by entropic contributions. At higher temperatures
the city tends to become homogeneous, as the effect of “noise”
(i.e., of the features that are not described in the model) dom-
inates over the utility associated to the densities of the blocks
(see Fig. 4).
Discussion
In the limit α = 0, our model becomes similar to Schelling’s
segregation model [8], with two main differences : the exis-
tence of agents of two colors and the definition of the agent’s
neighborhoods. We now show that these additional features
do not introduce any essential effect.
Let us start by introducing agents of two “colors” (such
as red and green). Simple calculations (see Supporting infor-
mation) show that for two species which only care about the
density of neighbors of their own color, the block potential
(Eq. 6) becomes :
f(ρR, ρG) = −TρR ln ρR − TρG ln ρG
− T (1− ρR − ρG) ln(1− ρR − ρG)
+ α
h
ρR uR(ρR) + ρG uG(ρG)
i
+ (1− α)
h Z ρR
0
uR(ρ
′)dρ′ +
Z ρG
0
uG(ρ
′)dρ′
i
with straightforward notations (for example uR(ρR) repre-
sents the utility of a red agent in a block with a density ρR
of red agents). In the more general case of utility functions
depending on both the density of similar and dissimilar neigh-
bors, it is also possible to derive a block potential if the utility
functions verify a symmetry constraint. This constraint is not
very restrictive, in the sense that no qualitative feature of the
model is lost when one restrains the study to utilities that
verify it (see the Supporting Information).
Finding the equilibrium configurations amounts to find-
ing the set {ρqR, ρqG} which maximizes the potential F (x) =P
q f(ρqR, ρqG) with the constraints
P
q ρqR = Qρ0R andP
q ρqG = Qρ0G, where ρ0G and ρ0R represent respectively
the overall concentration of green and red agents.
Because of the spatial constraints (the densities of red and
green agents in each block q must verify ρqR + ρqG ≤ 1), the
‘two populations’ model can not formally be reduced to two
independent ‘one population’ models. However, the station-
ary states can still be easily computed. Let us focus once
again on the T → 0 limit and suppose for example that
ρ0R = ρ0G = ρ0/2. The stationary state depends once again
on the values of ρ0, m and α. For low values of α, it can be
shown that the system settles in segregated states where each
block contains only one kind of agent with a density ρ0 (see
Figure 5a). For α ≥ αc, the system settles in mixed states
where the density of a group in a block is either 0 or 1/2 (see
Figure 5b). The reader is referred to Supporting Information
for more details.
We now turn to the difference in agent’s neighborhoods.
In Schelling’s original model, agents’ neighbors are defined
as their 8 nearest neighbors. Our model considers instead
predefined blocks of common neighbors. First, it should be
noted that there is no decisive argument in favor of either
neighborhood definition in terms of the realism of the de-
scription of real social neighborhoods. Second, we note that
introducing blocks allows for an analytical solution for arbi-
trary utility functions. This contrasts with the nearest neigh-
bor case, where the best analytical approach solves only a
modified model which abandons the individual point of view
and is limited to a specific utility function [11]. Finally, the
simulations presented on Figure 5 show that the transition
from segregated to mixed states is not affected by the choice
of the neighborhood’s definition. We conclude that the block
description is more adapted to this kind of simple modeling,
which aims at showing stylized facts as segregation transitions.
Our simple model raises a number of interesting questions
about collective or individual points of view. In the purely col-
lective case (α = 1), the stationary state corresponds to the
maximization of the average utility, in analogy to the mini-
mization of energy in physics. In the opposite case (α = 0),
the stationary state strongly differs from the simple collection
of individual optima [21]: the optimization strategy based on
purely individual dynamics fails, illustrating the unexpected
links between micromotives and macrobehavior [22]. How-
ever, the emergent collective state can be efficiently captured
by the maximization of the link function ℓ(ρ) given in Eq. (5),
up to constraints in the overall town density. This function
intimately connects the individual and global points of view.
First, it depends only on the global town configuration (given
by the ρq), allowing a relatively simple calculation of the equi-
librium. At the same time, it can be interpreted as the sum of
the individual marginal utilities gained by agents as they pro-
gressively fill the city after leaving a reservoir of zero utility.
In the stationary state, a maximal value of the potential L is
reached. This means that no agent can increase its utility by
moving (since ∆u = ∆L), consistently with the economists’
definition of a Nash equilibrium.
Equilibrium statistical mechanics has developed powerful
tools to link the microscopic and macroscopic levels. These
tools are limited to physical systems, where dynamics is gov-
erned by a global quantity such as the total energy. By intro-
ducing a link function, analogous to state functions in ther-
modynamics or potential functions in game theory [23], we
have extended the framework of statistical mechanics to a
Schelling-like model. Such an approach paves the way to an-
alytical treatments of a much wider class of systems, where
dynamics is governed by individual strategies.
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Table 1. Characteristics of the segregated
equilibrium. The table displays the density ρs
in the non-empty blocks, the normalized collec-
tive utility U∗ and the normalized link L∗ of the
stationary configurations obtained for α = 0. It
is straightforward to check that U∗(m) ≤ 1 and
L∗(m) ≥ 1/2 for m ≤ 1.
m < 2/3 2/3 ≤ m ≤ 1
ρs
1
2
p
(2−m)/(1−m) 1
U∗
1
1 +
p
(1−m)/(2−m)
m
L∗
1
1 +
p
(1−m)/(2−m)
1/2 +m/4
Fig. 1. Configurations of a city composed of Q = 36 blocks containing each H = 100
cells, with ρ0 = 1/2. (a) Mixed state. Stationary state of the city for m = 0.5,
α = 1 and T → 0. Agents are distributed homogeneously between the blocks, each of them
having a density of 0.5. (b) Segregated configuration. Stationary state of the city for
m = 0.5, α = 0 and T → 0. Agents are gathered on 22 blocks of mean density 0.82,
the other blocks being empty. In the original Schelling model [8], each agent has a distinct
neighborhood, defined by its 8 nearest neighbors. Here, we only keep the essential ingredient
of blocks of distinct densities. Our model shows the same qualitative behavior as Schelling’s
but can be solved exactly, thanks to the partial reduction of agent’s heterogeneity.
Fig. 2. Asymmetrically peaked individual utility as a function of block density. The utility is
defined as u(ρ) = 2ρ if ρ ≤ 1/2 and u(ρ) = m+2(1−m)(1− ρ) if ρ > 1/2, where
0 < m < 1 is the asymmetry parameter. Agents strictly prefer half-filled neighborhoods
(ρ = 1/2). They also prefer overcrowded (ρ = 1) neighborhoods to empty ones (ρ = 0).
Footline Author PNAS Issue Date Volume Issue Number 5
Fig. 3. Phase diagram of the global utility as a function of the cooperativity α and the
asymmetrym, at T → 0 and ρ0 = 1/2. The average utility per agent U∗ = U/(ρ0HQ)
is calculated by maximizing the potential F (x) for the peaked utility shown in Fig. 2, see
Supporting Information. The plateau at high values of α corresponds to the mixed phase of
optimal utility, which is separated from the segregated state by a phase transition arising at
αc = 1/(3 − 2m). The overall picture is qualitatively unchanged for low but finite values
of the temperature, see Supporting Information.
Fig. 4. Phase diagrams for the asymmetrically peaked individual utility (Fig. 2,
with m = 0.8) for different values of T . Increasing the temperature T tends to favour
homogeneous states. For small but finite temperatures (roughly T < 0.2), the phase diagram
is modified only for extremal values of ρ0, as expected from the entropic term Ts(ρ) =
−Tρ ln ρ − T (1 − ρ) ln(1 − ρ). As T is increased, the whole diagram is affected by
the entropic term. Compared to the T = 0 case, the main change is the appearance of a
second homogeneous phase for ρ0 < 1/2. But while for ρ0 > 1/2 homogeneity corresponds
to the optimal choice for the agents, for ρ0 < 1/2, collective utility is not maximized in a
homogeneous city. The city is homogeneous by noise, not by choice. Note that an increase in α
tends to reduce this domain, while it tends to increase the homogeneous domain for ρ0 > 1/2.
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Fig. 5. Stationary configurations obtained by simulating the evolution of a city inhabited
by a equal number of red and green agents whose preference are given by the asymmetrically
peaked utility function (m = 0.5). The rate of vacant cells (in white) is fixed to 10%.
Top panel. The city is divided into blocks of size H = 100. In accordance with the
analytic model, a segregated configuration is obtained when α = 0 (snapshot a) and a more
homogeneous configuration is obtained for α = 1 (snapshot b). Bottom panel. The
utility of an agent depends on the local density of similar neighbors computed on theH = 108
nearest cells. While of different topological nature, a segregated configuration is still obtained for
α = 0 (snapshot c) and a homogeneous configuration is still obtained for α = 1 (snapshot d).
In all those simulations, we take T = 0.1. The small amount of noise hence generated, while
not changing the nature of the stationary states compared to the case T → 0, conveniently
reduces the time of convergence of the system.
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